Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous Peoples—Australian Case Studies by Blakeney, Michael
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 22 
Number 2 Special Issue: Indigenous Rights in 
the Pacific Rim 
3-1-2013 
Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous Peoples—Australian 
Case Studies 
Michael Blakeney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael Blakeney, Protecting the Spiritual Beliefs of Indigenous Peoples—Australian Case Studies, 22 Pac. 
Rim L & Pol'y J. 391 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol22/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
391 
 
PROTECTING THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS 
OF INDIGENOUS  




Abstract: This article examines the extent to which the spiritual beliefs of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples are protected under current Australian law.  
The first significant recognition by the High Court of Australia of the legal rights of 
indigenous peoples was in relation to native title over real property.  As those peoples 
define their status and society by reference to their relationship with the land, this article 
considers the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to protect their spiritual beliefs as an 
incident of native title law.  It reviews a line of intellectual property cases which have 
been a more fruitful source of protection, as well as the possibilities of the protection of 
the spiritual beliefs of indigenous peoples under racial vilification laws.  With changes to 
the Australian Constitution to recognize the particular rights of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples currently under consideration, the article concludes with the 
speculation that specific Federal legislation could achieve the protection of their spiritual 
beliefs. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER 
PEOPLES OF AUSTRALIA 
Carbon-dated human remains provide evidence of at least 60,000 
years of the occupation of Australia by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples.1  When the first white settlers arrived in 1788, an estimated 300,000 
to more than one million Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 
inhabited the Australian continent.2  Aboriginal society comprised hundreds 
of language groups of varying sizes. 3   Each language group shared a 
common language, territory and cultural attributes.4  Until the formation of 
the Australian Federation in 1901, the current States and Territories of 
Australia were separate British Colonies, each pursuing their own policies 
concerning the recognition or repression of indigenous culture and 
traditional life. 5   Similar to other colonized countries 6  with indigenous 
                                                      
† Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia.  
1  Amanda  H. Lynch, et al.,  Using the Paleorecord to Evaluate Climate and Fire Interactions in 
Australia, 35 ANN. REV. OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCI. 215, 228 (2007). 
2  E. Bourke, Australia’s First Peoples: Identity and Population, in ABORIGINAL STUDIES: AN 
INTRODUCTORY READER IN ABORIGINAL STUDIES 38 (C. Bourke, E. Bourke & W.H. Edwards eds., 2d ed. 
1998). 
3  See R. M. W. DIXON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN LANGUAGES: THEIR NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT  
(2002). 
4  RICHARD BROOME, ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIANS: BLACK RESPONSES TO WHITE DOMINANCE 9 (2d 
ed. 1994).   
5  For a recent historiographical review of Aboriginal history, see Bain Attwood, Aboriginal History, 
Minority Histories and Historical Wounds, 14 POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 171 (2011). 
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communities, there were cyclical periods of tolerance, protection, or even 
qualified approval interspersed with periods of rejection when attempts were 
made to eradicate traditional ways and to “assimilate” Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Peoples, by seeking to absorb them and deny them any 
separate identity.7  Probably the most notorious example of the latter was the 
policy of forcible removal of Aboriginal children from their parents to be 
brought up by fostering institutions as members of the white community.  
This policy commenced in colonial times until as recently as the 1970s.8 
At the time when the instructions were being prepared by the British 
Colonial Office for Arthur Phillip, the first Governor of the first Australian 
Colony, the legal theory which underpinned those instructions was that of 
William Blackstone,9 that the Australian continent was “terra nullius”10 with 
the consequence that all applicable English laws were immediately in force 
in the colony.  No account was taken of the laws or belief systems of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, as they would have been if 
Australia had been regarded as a conquered colony in the Blackstonian 
sense.11  In 1788, when the First Fleet of white settlers arrived in Australia, 
no overarching Aboriginal political system existed to link the many 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples to resist colonization.12  The 
historical record of Aboriginal Resistance to white settlement, and indeed 
whether Australia should have been regarded as a conquered or settled 
colony in the Blackstonian sense, is the subject of a vigorous contemporary 
debate.13  However, as far as Australian jurisprudence is concerned, the High 
                                                                                                                                                              
6  See, e.g., TASK FORCE THREE: FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION AND STRUCTURE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE 6-7 (1976). 
7  See the authorities referred to in Tim Rowse, The Reforming State, the Concerned Public and 
Indigenous Political Actors, 56 AUSTRALIAN J. OF POL. & HIST. 66 (2010). 
8  See BRINGING THEM HOME, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF 
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES (Canberra, Commonwealth 
of Australia 1997). 
9  GEORGE CHASE, BLACKSTONE (37) COMMENTARIES, Bk. I, ch. 4, 106-108. 
10  Meaning “land belonging to no one.” 
11  See the discussion in Ulla Secher, The Mabo Decision–Preserving the Distinction Between 
'Settled' and 'Conquered or Ceded' Territories, 24 UNIV. OF QUEENSLAND L.J. 35 (2005). 
12  See, e.g., IAN KEEN, ABORIGINAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AUSTRALIA AT THE THRESHOLD OF 
COLONISATION (2004).  
13  The leading antagonist is Henry Reynolds.  See, e.g., HENRY REYNOLDS, FRONTIER: ABORIGINES, 
SETTLERS AND LAND (1996); KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE, THE FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY: 
VOLUME ONE, VAN DIEMEN’S LAND, 1803-1847 (2003).  Among the avalanche of historiography generated 
by this controversy are WHITEWASH: ON KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE'S FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY 
(Robert Manne ed., 2003); STUART MACINTYRE AND ANNA CLARK, THE HISTORY WARS (2004);  JOHN 
DAWSON, WASHOUT: ON THE ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO THE FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY (2004); 
BAIN ATTWOOD, TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT ABORIGINAL HISTORY (2005); GENOCIDE AND SETTLER 
SOCIETY: FRONTIER VIOLENCE AND STOLEN INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY (A. Dirk 
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Court of Australia in its celebrated 1992 decision Mabo v. Queensland (No. 
2)14 held that: 
 
[W]hatever the justification advanced in earlier days for 
refusing to recognize the rights and interests in land of the 
indigenous inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and 
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be 
accepted . . . It is imperative in today’s world that the common 
law should neither be nor be seen to be frozen in an age of 
racial discrimination.  The fiction by which the rights and 
interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as non-
existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the 
contemporary law of this country.15 
This article examines whether this more enlightened attitude, formulated in 
the context of land law, extends to protecting the spiritual beliefs of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  As will be seen below, the 
High Court of Australia took the position in Western Australia v Ward16 that 
these spiritual beliefs are adequately protected by intellectual property (“IP”) 
law.  This article will show that Australian IP law falls short in this regard, 
although some faith has been placed in the possibility of the reworking of 
the international IP environment through the promulgation by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) of international conventions 
dealing with the protection of traditional cultural expressions and traditional 
knowledge. 
II. ABORIGINAL SPIRITUALITY 
The central tenet of traditional Aboriginal beliefs is the “Dreamtime,” 
described for the first time by anthropologists in the late nineteenth century 
to refer to their understanding of the Aboriginal explanation of the creation 
by of the world by Ancestral Beings who emerged at the dawn of creation 
from the earth and from spirit homes in the sky.17  Some Ancestral Beings 
                                                                                                                                                              
Moses ed., 2005); TONY TAYLOR, DENIAL. HISTORY BETRAYED (2008); JAMES BOYCE, VAN DIEMEN’S 
LAND (2008). 
14  (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
15  Frank Brennan S.J., Mabo and Its Implications for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, in 
MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUATION (M.A. Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993).   
16  [2002] HCA 28 (Austl.). 
17  See Patrick Wolfe, On Being Woken Up: The Dreamtime in Anthropology and in Australian 
Settler Culture, 32 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 197 (1991).  On the other hand, Drahos suggests that it 
would be preferable to refer to Aboriginal “cosmologies” in describing the connections between different 
parts or objects of the Aboriginal knowledge system, linking a place, a painting, an object, a word and a 
ceremony.  Peter Drahos, When Cosmology Meets Property: Indigenous People’s Innovation and 
Intellectual Property, 29 PROMETHEUS 233, 237 (2011). 
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assumed forms that combined features of humans with other species, such as 
kangaroos, crocodiles, tortoises or birds.18  As they traveled over the earth, 
the Ancestral Beings created the sea and sky and the physical characteristics 
of the landscape, such as mountains, rivers and waterholes.19  They also 
created the sacred rules of human social life and culture that were passed on 
to human beings.20  The Ancestral Beings entrusted custodianship of certain 
areas of land to particular language groups on the condition that they 
observed these sacred rules.  Different tribes or clans have different creator 
ancestors who are venerated in much the same way as are the sacred figures 
of, for example, the Christian religion.21  Dreaming places, or sacred sites, 
are a constant reminder of the presence and power of the Ancestral Beings 
and represent the bond between the people and the land.22   Finally, for 
Aboriginal Peoples the Dreamtime remains relevant to and connected with 
the present, and will endure forever.23 
A. The Wandjina 
The Wandjina 24  are the creator ancestors of a number of the 
Aboriginal Peoples 25  of the Kimberley region 26  of the northern part of 
Western Australia.27   These peoples believe that the Wandjina were the 
cloud and rain spirits who created the landscape and the animals and peoples 
within it. 28   The Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples also believe that the 
                                                      
18  See HOWARD MORPHY, ANCESTRAL CONNECTIONS: ART AND AN ABORIGINAL SYSTEM OF 
KNOWLEDGE 221 (1991). 
19  Id. at 220-22. 
20  See LYNNE HUME, ANCESTRAL POWER: THE DREAMING CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ABORIGINAL 
AUSTRALIANS (2002). 
21  See Jeremy Beckette, Aboriginal Histories, Aboriginal Myths: An Introduction, 65 OCEANIA 97 
(1994); Alan Rumsey, The Dreaming, Human Agency and Inscriptive Practice, 65 OCEANIA 116 (1994). 
22 See, e.g., IAN KEEN, KNOWLEDGE AND SECRECY IN AN ABORIGINAL RELIGION 211 (1994). 
23  See JENNIFER ISAACS, AUSTRALIAN DREAMING: 40,000 YEARS OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY (1980); 
Deborah Bird Rose, Consciousness and Responsibility in an Australian Aboriginal Religion, in WILLIAM H. 
MORPHY, TRADITIONAL ABORIGINAL SOCIETY: A READER 257–69 (Macmillan ed. Melbourne, 1987); 
Morphy, supra note 18; KEEN, supra note 22; FRANCOISE DUSSART, THE POLITICS OF RITUAL IN AN 
ABORIGINAL SETTLEMENT: KINSHIP, GENDER, AND THE CURRENCY OF KNOWLEDGE (2000). 
24  Also spelled:  Wonjina, Wanjina and Ounjina. 
25  Principally the Mowanjum, Ngarinyin, Worrorra, and Wunambal peoples of the north-western and 
central Kimberley. 
26  The Kimberley is an area of 423,517 square kilometers (163,521 square miles) in Northwestern 
Australia. 
27  See the authorities referred to in CHRISTOPH B. GRABER, WANJINA AND WUNGGURR: THE 
PROPERTISATION OF ABORIGINAL ROCK ART UNDER AUSTRALIAN LAW, in SOZIOLOGISCHE JURISPRUDENZ. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GUNTHER TEUBNER ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 275-297 (Caliess Gralf-Peter et al. eds., 
2009). 
28  See I.M. Crawford, The Art of the Wandjina: Aboriginal Cave Paintings in Kimberley, Western 
Australia, 74 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 118 (1972); Charles P. Mountford, The Art of the Wandjina: 
Aboriginal Cave Paintings in Kimberley, Western Australia, 5 MAN 160; THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ART: A 
REFLECTION ON ITS HISTORY & CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE (Morphy et al. eds., 2005).   
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Wandjina painted images of themselves in caves and rock shelters 
throughout the Kimberley region,29 located adjacent to where the Wandjina 
chose to die.  Wandjina are painted as full-length, or simply head and 
shoulder, figures with large mouthless faces with enormous black eyes 
flanking a beak-like nose.30  In some places, the Wandjina is painted as an 
animal such as a crocodile, which are endemic to the region.31  The absence 
of a mouth represents the idea that Wandjina are so powerful that they do 
not require speech.  If a mouth was to appear on a Wandjina image, this 
would portend floods and cyclones.32  A band usually surrounds the head of 
the Wandjina with outward radiating lines, signifying the feathers that the 
Wandjinas wore and the lightning that they control.33 
Today, certain Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples repaint the images in 
tribal ceremonies in December and January to ensure the continuity of the 
Wandjina’s presence and also to ensure the arrival of the monsoon rains.34  
In addition to its spiritual significance, these repainted images have the 
practical effect of identifying the continual connection of Aboriginal Peoples 
with their tribal lands which is significant in Australian Native Title claims.  
A Native Title claim may be made under the Federal Native Title Act 1993 
whereby Aboriginal Peoples can assert rights of access, enjoyment and the 
protection of places of spiritual and cultural significance in relation to lands 
which others may wish to use for mining, pastoral, or other commercial 
purposes.35  For example, in Neowarra v State of Western Australia,36 the 
Native Title Tribunal had to consider the Native Title claims of peoples of 
the Ngarinyin, Wunambal and Worrorra language groups over more than 
                                                      
29  See Nancy D. Munn, 74 AM. ANTHROPOLOGISTS 118 (1972) (reviewing Crawford, supra note 28); 
Ian J. McNiven & Lynette  Russell, ‘Strange Paintings’ and ‘Mystery Races:’ Kimberley Rock-Art, 
Diffusionism and Colonialist Constructions of Australia's Aboriginal Past, 71 ANTIQUITY, 801, 809 (1997); 
JOSEPHINE FLOOD, ROCK ART OF THE DREAMTIME (Angus and Robertson eds., 1997). 
30  See Crawford, supra note 28. 
31  Id. 
32  See JOSEPHINE FLOOD, ROCK ART OF THE DREAMTIME 32 (1997); Wandjina, ABORIGINAL ART 
NEWS, NOV. 23, 2001, available at http://news.aboriginalartdirectory.com/2001/11/wandjina.php. 
33  See W. Arndt, The Australian Evolution of the Wandjinas from Rainclouds, 34 OCEANIA 161 
(1964); Valda Blundell, The Art of Country: Aesthetics, Place, and Aboriginal Identity in North-West 
Australia, in DAVID S. TRIGGER & GARETH GRIFFITHS, DISPUTED TERRITORIES: LAND, CULTURE AND 
IDENTITY IN SETTLER SOCIETIES 155–85 (2003). 
34  See David Mowaljarlai & C. Peck, Ngarinyin, Cultural Continuity: A Project to Teach the Young 
People Our Culture, 2 AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL 71 (1987); Graeme Ward, Ochre and Acrylic: Conflicting 
Ideologies and Divergent Discourses in the Issue of Repainting of Aboriginal Imagery, in RETOUCH: 
MAINTENANCE AND CONSERVATION OF ABORIGINAL ROCK IMAGERY, PROCEEDINGS OF SYMPOSIUM O, 
RETOUCH: AN OPTION TO CONSERVATION?  AUSTRALIAN ROCK ART RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 5 (Graeme 
Ward ed., 1992); Sandra Bowdler, Repainting Australian Rock Art, 62 ANTIQUITY 517 (1988).  
35  See UNSETTLING ANTHROPOLOGY: THE DEMANDS OF NATIVE TITLE ON WORN CONCEPTS AND 
CHANGING LIVES (Toni Bauman & Gaynro Mcdonald eds., 2011).   
36  [2003] FCA 1402 (Austl.). 
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100,000 square kilometres against the State of Western Australia, the West 
Australian Fishing Industry Council and against a number of pastoral lessees, 
bauxite miners and a telecommunications company. 37   The claimants 
asserted that their peoples had occupied the region for as long as 26,000 
years.38  They gathered evidence about the spiritual association of these 
peoples with their Wandjina creators, and they explained their practice of 
renewing the paint on the Wandjina images within their respective tribal 
areas.39  A 1997 study found that there were often thirty to fifty layers of 
paint on Wandjina images.40  A recent review of rock art dating in the 
Kimberley region provides a range of dates commencing from between 
33,000 and 42,000 years ago.41 
Evidence indicated that the Wandjina was a central feature of the 
belief systems of the tribes of the region.  One witness explained: 
 
[W]e . . .  represent Wanjina we are all Wanjina tribe and we 
tell the story what happened, the story from his time and he left 
us to look after this country because we are his people, we are 
his servants to look after and we look after him. . . .  He talk for 
us, we talk for him.  All the same, that's what we are here for in 
this land.42 
 
The opponents of the Native Title claim pointed to the lack of uniformity of 
practice of the three tribes in relation to the laws and customs concerning 
Wandjina history, tradition and meaning.43  The Tribunal accepted that from 
the mosaic of the Aboriginal evidence, which was delivered with differing 
degrees of proficiency in English, that “Wandjina created the land and 
waters and what lives on or in them, and laid down laws and customs around 
which the Aboriginal people have constructed their lives.  The evidence 
discloses the continued prominence of Wandjina beliefs.”44 
                                                      
37 Id. at para. 10. 
38  Id. at para. 11.  
39  See, e.g., id. at para. 277-85; see also Martin Porr & Hannah Rachel Bell, ‘Rock-Art’, ‘Animism’ 
and Two-Way Thinking: Towards a Complementary Epistemology in the Understanding of Material 
Culture and ‘Rock-art’ of Hunting and Gathering People, 19 J. OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD & THEORY 
161 (2012).  
40  Neowarra, FCA 1402, at para. 282, referencing A. Watchman, Dating the Kimberley Rock  
Paintings, in KEVIN FRANCIS KENNEALLY, MIKE DONALDSON, KIMBERLEY SOCIETY, ET AL., 
ABORIGINAL ROCK ART OF THE KIMBERLEY 39-45 (1997)). 
41  See Jane Balme, Excavation Revealing 40,000 Years of Occupation at Mimbi Caves, South 
Central Kimberley, Western Australia, 51 AUSTRALIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 1 (2000); Maxine Aubert, A Review 
of Rock Art Dating in the Kimberley, Western Australia, 39 J. OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL SCI. 573–77 (2012). 
42  Id. at para. 168. 
43 Id. at paras. 154-59. 
44  Id. at para. 177. 
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In Neowarra, the Tribunal explained that each tribe had the sacred 
obligation to repaint and maintain the Wandjina images within their 
territories.45  For the purposes of the Native Title claim, these practices were 
accepted as part of the matrix of evidence which connected the three tribes 
to the land which was the subject of the claim.46 
This article examines the extent to which the spiritual beliefs of 
Aboriginal Peoples are protected under Australian law. 
B. Misuse of Wandjina Images 
It has been suggested that sacred images such as the Wandjina 
perform the same function for Aboriginal Peoples as do images of Christ and 
the Holy Trinity for Christianity.47  However, the denigration of Christian 
belief is sanctioned by the common law offense of blasphemy,48 whereas 
non-deistic beliefs do not appear to fall within this protection.  For example 
the colonies of Connecticut, 49  Delaware, 50  Maine, 51  Massachusetts, 52 
Maryland, 53  and Pennsylvania 54  had laws which criminalized blasphemy 
which remained in place after the formation of the United States of 
America. 55   In each statute the offense was defined by reference to 
Christianity.  Thus, in The State v. Chandler, 56  the Supreme Court of 
Delaware pointed out that “it appears to have been long perfectly settled by 
the common law, that blasphemy against the Deity in general, or a malicious 
and wanton attack against the Christian religion individually, for the purpose 
of exposing its doctrines to contempt and ridicule, is indictable and 
punishable as a temporal offense.”57  Although the United States Supreme 
                                                      
45  Id. at paras. 277-85.  See also David Mowaljarlai, et al., Repainting of Images on Rock in 
Australia and the Maintenance of Aboriginal Culture, 67 ANTIQUITY 690 (1988). 
46  Id. at paras. 379-83.   
47  See Glenn Pilkington, The Wandjina Spirit: From Rock to Wall, available at 
http://www.artsource.net.au/as_downloads/newsletter/Summer2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
48  See DAVID LAWTON, BLASPHEMY ch. 1 (1993). 
49  JOHN B. DILLON, ODDITIES OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION IN AMERICA AS APPLIED TO THE PUBLIC 
LANDS, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION, RELIGION, MORALS, INDIANS, ETC. 39 (1879) available at 
http://www.unz.org/Pub/DillonJohn-1879.   
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 31, 33. 
53  Id. at 30-31. 
54  Id. at 36. 
55  The country’s first blasphemy case, People v. Ruggles Johson, 8 Johns 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811), 
involved offensive words denigrating Jesus Christ and his mother. 
56  1 Del. (1 Harr.) 553 (1837). 
57  Similarly, see the decisions of the Supreme Court the State of Pennsylvania in 1824 in Updegraph 
v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawl 394 (Pa. 1824) and in Zeisweiss v. James, et al., 63 Pa. State Rep. 465 
(1870); and of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Mass. (1 
Pick.) 206 (1838).   
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Court in the 1952 case Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,58 held that the New 
York State blasphemy law was an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom 
of speech as it was “…not the business of government in our nation to 
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine…,”59 
the Supreme Court of Maine in the 1921 case State v. Mockus60 had held it 
to be a breach of public peace by word or deed to “expose the God of the 
Christian religion, or the Holy Scriptures, “to contempt and ridicule” or to 
“rob official oaths of any of their sanctity, thus undermining the foundations 
of their binding force.”61 
The potential issue of blasphemy in an indigenous Australian context 
arose in 2007 when street graffiti depictions of Wandjina appeared in Perth, 
the State capital of Western Australia.62  This caused some consternation to 
the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples, who were concerned about the 
unauthorized depictions of Wandjina Spirit.63  They pointed out the sacred 
significance of the Wandjina for its traditional custodians, but the Christian 
context of the offense of blasphemy dissuaded litigation of this issue.64  It 
should also be mentioned that even the common law action has been 
abolished as anachronistic in many common law jurisdictions.65 
As will be seen below, it has been suggested that IP law is a better 
vehicle for dealing with the protection of the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  However, in 1995 the National 
Indigenous Arts Advocacy Association, Inc. (“NIAAA”) reported the 
unauthorized use of the Wandjina spirit as a logo for a surfboard company.66  
Analyzing the problem as an intellectual property issue, the NIAAA pointed 
out that authorship was impossible to resolve as it is believed that the 
paintings were done by the Wandjina themselves.  Of course, even if 
                                                      
58  343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
59  Id. at 505. 
60  113 A. 39; 120 Me. 84 (1921). 
61  Id. at 41. 
62  Paige Taylor, ‘Wandering Wandjinas' Mystery, SUNDAY TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, available at 
http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/wandering-wandjinas-mystery/story-e6frg13u-
1111112784667. 
63  See Who Paintin’ Dis Wadjina?, a movie produced by Taryne Laffar (Australia 2007) which 
examines the impact of hundreds of spray-painted images of Wandjinas in Perth and surrounds, available 
at http://www.creativespirits.info/resources/movies/who-paintin-dis-wandjina#ixzz2JdgOCeap. 
64  See Pilkington, supra note 47. 
65  See Jeremy Patrick, The Curious Persistence of Blasphemy, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 187 (2011).  
66 NATIONAL INDIGENOUS ARTS ADVOCACY ASSOCIATION, STOPPING THE RIP-OFFS INQUIRY 5 
(1995). 
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authorship could be resolved, the antiquity of these images also means that 
they are outside the length of copyright protection.67 
III. PROHIBITION OF RACIAL VILIFICATION 
The unauthorized use of the sacred images of Aboriginal Peoples could 
possibly be challenged on the basis that it constitutes actionable racial 
vilification.  However, complaints relying on the Federal Racial Hatred Act 
1995 illustrate the limitations of this legislation in protecting the sacred 
beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  The Act inserted a 
new part into the Australian Racial Discrimination Act 1975 after concerns 
about racist violence and harassment directed against indigenous peoples.68  
Section 18C(1) provides that it is unlawful for a person to do an act, 
otherwise than in private, if: 
(a)  the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to 
offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a 
group of people; and 
(b)  the act is done because of the race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the 
people in the group. 
Exempted from proscription by Section 18D is anything said or done 
“reasonably and in good faith”: 
 
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic 
work; or 
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or 
debate made  or held for any genuine academic, artistic or 
scientific purpose or  any other genuine purpose in the public 
interest; or 
(c)  in making or publishing: 
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public  
interest; or 
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if 
the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the 
person making the comment. 
                                                      
67  See Michael Blakeney, Protecting Cultural Expressions of Indigenous Peoples: The Australian 
Perspective, 89 COPYRIGHT WORLD 1, 5-7 (1999). 
68  The Explanatory Memorandum, Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) stated that the legislation sought to 
address concerns highlighted by the findings of the HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO RACIST VIOLENCE 387 (1991), which found that 
racist violence against Indigenous people was an 'endemic' problem in Australia 387; see also N. Poynder, 
Racial Vilification Legislation, 71 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 4 (1994). 
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Section 18C has been criticized because “its key words and phrases are 
sufficiently imprecise in both their definition and application as to make the 
putative legal standards they embody largely devoid of any core and 
ascertainable content.” 69   Practically, it is difficult to show that the 
unauthorized use of Aboriginal spiritual images is an act done “because of 
the race . . . of the other person.”70  The words “offend” and “insult” are also 
vague.  And, with the possible exception of cases involving extreme racist 
conduct, the ambiguity of the section is such that “too many determinations 
could comfortably and justifiably have been decided the other way.”71  So 
far, the case law has been inconclusive.72 
Corunna v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd.,73 which concerned an 
application brought by an Aboriginal elder on behalf of a number of 
Nyungar elders, highlights the challenge of interpreting the Racial Hatred 
Act’s reasonableness standard.  The Nyungar are the Aboriginal People of 
the Perth region.  The case involved the publication of a cartoon in the West 
Australian newspaper which arose from attempts of elders to retrieve the 
head of an ancestral warrior, Yagan, from the Liverpool Infirmary in 
England. 74   The cartoon was allegedly demeaning of Nyungar people, 
particularly in relation to their Dreamtime ancestor Waugyl.  The applicant 
argued that this conduct ought to be judged under Section 18C(l)(a) 
according to whether the cartoon was reasonably likely to offend a person 
who was an Aboriginal person of the Nyungar group, even though it may not 
have offended a reasonable non-Aboriginal person.  The respondent argued 
against the adoption of a reasonable Aboriginal or Nyungar standard and 
submitted that a “reasonable ordinary reader” of the newspaper was the 
correct standard by which to judge the offensiveness of the conduct.  The 
Commissioner agreed with the applicant that the appropriate question was 
whether a “reasonable Nyungar or Aboriginal person” would, in all the 
circumstances, be offended by the cartoon.75 
                                                      
69  Dan Meagher, So Far So Good?: A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws in Australia, 
32 FED. L. REV. 225 (2004). 
70  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 18(C)(1)(a) (Austl.). 
71  Id.; see also Wojciech Sadurski, Offending with Impunity: Racial Vilification and Freedom of 
Speech, 14 SYDNEY L. REV. 163 (1992). 
72  See Beth Gaze, Has the Racial Discrimination Act Contributed to Eliminating Racial 
Discrimination? Analysing the Litigation Track Record 2000-2004, 11 AUSTRALIAN J. OF HUM. RTS. 6 
(2005); Brad Jessup, Five Years On: A Critical Evaluation of the Racial Hatred Act 1995, 6 DEAKIN L. 
REV. 91 (2001). 
73  [2001] EOC 93-146 (Austl.). 
74  See Hannah McGlade, The Repatriation of Yagan: A Story of Manufacturing Dissent, 4 L., TEXT, 
CULTURE 252 (1998). 
75  [2001] EOC 793-146 at 75, 468 (Austl.). 
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However, the Commissioner ultimately dismissed the complaint on the 
ground that the respondent could rely upon the exception in Section 18D, 
ruling that the newspaper had acted “reasonably and in good faith” in 
publishing the cartoon, finding that testing the cartoon against “moral and 
ethical consideration, expressive of community standards,” it did not act 
outside the “margin of tolerance” allowed under Section 18D. 76   The 
Commissioner concluded that while it may be argued that the cartoon could 
be characterized as “exaggerated” or “prejudiced,” it was not sufficiently 
exaggerated or “prejudiced (having regard to the surrounding circumstances) 
to breach the standard of reasonableness.”77  This case has been dismissed as 
an example of the “reification of dominant racial values” which prioritizes 
“non-indigenous racial narratives over Indigenous perspectives.” 78  The best 
that can be said for this case is that it emphasized the looseness of the 
reasonableness standard. 
In contrast, the Commissioner in Mingli Wanjurri and Others v. 
Southern Cross Broadcasting Ltd. and Howard Sattler 79  sustained the 
complaints, finding a breach of Section 18C. 80   This case concerned a 
program on the radio station 6PR (owned by the media chain Southern 
Cross) hosted by the controversial announcer, Howard Sattler. 81   Two 
persons described as taxi drivers made statements claimed to be derogatory 
of Nyungar culture and beliefs.  The broadcast referred to Nyungar protests 
about the re-development of a brewery site, recognized by Nyungars as 
Goonininup, the resting place of the Waugal or Rainbow Serpent.  The 
Rainbow Serpent plays an important role in the belief systems of a number 
of Australian Aboriginal Peoples, particularly in relation to the creation of 
waterholes and other resources.82 
The same Commissioner, who ruled against the Nyungar in the 
Corunna case, determined here that there was a breach of Section 18C.  
Among his findings were that the broadcast suggested among other things 
that: 
 
 Nyungar people lie about the existence of religious sites; 
                                                      
76  Id. at 75, 470. 
77  Id. 
78  Anna Chapman, Australian Racial Hatred Law: Some Comments on Reasonableness and 
Adjudicative Method in Complaints Brought by Indigenous People, 30 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 27 (2004). 
79  [2001] Matter No. 98/69 (Unreported, Commissioner Innes, 7 May 2001 (Austl.).  
80  See Hannah McGlade, Race Vilification Before the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, 5 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 8 (2001). 
81  Id. 
82  See Erich Kolig, The Rainbow Serpent in the Aboriginal Pantheon: A Review Article, 51 OCEANIA 
312 (1981). 
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 The Waugyl should have been killed with a shovel; 
 Nyungar religious sites are deserving of the same level of respect as a 
place where a person had his first sexual experience; 
 Nyungar people engaged in urinating, defecating and fornicating in a 
manner disrespectful of the site’s religious significance. 
 
The Commissioner ruled that the “derogatory comments about significant 
religious figures” could not be exempted and showed a “culpably reckless 
and callous indifference toward the Nyungar people.”83  The Commissioner 
noted that the Nyungar Elders continued to be very hurt and upset by the 
derogatory and insulting broadcast, which related to religious and cultural 
matters of great significance to them.84  They referred to the public nature of 
the comments and the fact that they were made to many thousands of 
listeners.  In light of these circumstances it was determined that an 
appropriate award was $10,000 Australian Dollars (“AUD”) for each 
complainant, a total amount of $50,000 AUD. 
The Corunna and Wanjurri cases demonstrate the possibilities and 
limits of the racial vilification law.  Whether the culturally inappropriate, 
demeaning, or even unauthorized use of the sacred symbols of Aboriginal 
Peoples can form the basis of a successful complaint under this legislation 
remains to be seen. 
IV. CULTURALLY INAPPROPRIATE USE OF SACRED IMAGES 
One arena in which the sacred beliefs of Aboriginal Peoples have been 
protected is in relation to land planning.  In Tenodi v Blue Mountains City 
Council,85 the New South Wales Land and Environment Court considered 
the unauthorized and inappropriate use of a Wandjina image in an eight-foot 
sculpture “Wandjina Watchers in Whispering Stone,” erected by the 
proprietor of a “wellness spa” in a town on the east coast of Australia, some 
2500 miles from the Kimberley. 86   It transpired that no environmental 
planning permission had been obtained for the sculpture under the local land 
planning laws.  Objectors included representatives from both the indigenous 
and non-indigenous community.  Evidence was provided by the objectors 
about Wandjina’s important role in the indigenous culture of the Worrorra, 
Ngarinyin and the Wunambal in the Kimberley for whom “the Wandjina is 
                                                      
83  McGlade, supra note 80. 
84  See also Natalie Clarke, App. to Intervene, 195/2010, Aug. 10, 2011, available at 
http://humanrights.gov.au/legal/submissions_court/intervention/clarke.html.  
85  [2011] NSWLEC 1183 (Austl.). 
86  See Delwyn Everard, Safeguarding Cultural Heritage–The Case of the Sacred Wandjina, WIPO 
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2011, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2011/06/article_ 
0003.html. 
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supreme creator, the maker of earth and all upon it.  Wandjina brought law 
that governs marriage relationships to people and land.”87  They explained 
that “Wandjina imagery is sacred; it cannot be used by them if it has not 
been approved.”88  Specifically, it was pointed out that: 
 
 the applicant is not from their language group and did not 
obtain permission to use the imagery; 
 the depiction of the Wandjina imagery incorporates 
mouths and the Wandjina is never depicted in this way 
(this depiction is particularly offensive to them); 
 the applicant was using Wandjina imagery for 
commercial purposes and thereby abusing their 
indigenous culture for private gain; 
 the Blue Mountains Region has its own creational 
ancestral beings and local Aboriginal groups find it 
inappropriate to bring these images and interpretation of 
these images to their country without permission.89 
 
The local Gundungurra and Durug people of the Blue Mountains area, who 
supported the position taken by the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples, also 
found the unauthorized use of the Wandjina imagery to be highly 
offensive.90 
The Land and Environment Court ruled that the failure of the sculptor 
to obtain the permission of the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples was not a 
matter which fell within the land planning legislation; instead, the prominent 
location of the sculpture and its public visibility meant that it would offend 
the “affected community.”91  This would presumably be the community of 
the Blue Mountains area, rather than the Kimberley Aboriginal Peoples. 
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS A MEANS OF PROTECTION OF 
ABORIGINAL SPIRITUAL BELIEFS 
In Australia, the most claims to protect the sacred beliefs of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples have been brought in IP law.  
The first of the IP cases was Foster v Mountford,92 which concerned an 
anthropology text Nomads of the Desert, written to document the life of the 
Pitjantjatjara People of the South Australian desert and which reproduced 
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images which were forbidden to uninitiated members of the Pitjantjatjara.93  
The court in this case was prepared to grant an injunction to prevent the 
book’s distribution in the Northern Territory because the author had been 
shown these sacred matters in confidence.94  The problem with breach of 
confidence as a basis for protecting sacred beliefs is that some confidential 
communication has to be established.  Preventing the unauthorized use of 
information or paintings and other artifacts in the public domain has to rely 
on some other field of IP protection.  In most cases, this has been copyright 
law. 
The earliest documented example in this regard concerned a graphic 
design used by the Reserve Bank of Australia which was used on Australia’s 
first decimal currency one dollar note which was introduced in 1967. The 
design was based on a painting by David Malangi of a Gurrmirringu 
mortuary feast. 95  An allegation of copyright infringement was made on 
behalf of the artist and on legal advice Dr. H. C. Coombs, the Governor of 
the Reserve Bank, provided the artist with $1000, a gift and a medallion as 
compensation and reward.  An Aboriginal commentator explained that this 
case was important for publicly fixing “the idea of the Aboriginal painter as 
an individually recognised art practitioner.”96  The sacred significance of the 
unauthorized reproduction was not canvassed in this case. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia was also involved in Yumbulul v. 
Reserve Bank of Australia97 which concerned its issuance of a $10 banknote 
to commemorate the 1988 bicentennial of white settlement in Australia.  The 
banknote, reproduced the design of a Morning Star Pole created by Terry 
Yumbulul, a Yolgnu artist.98  Evidence was presented which established that 
Morning Star Poles had a central role in Yolgnu l ceremonies 
commemorating the deaths of important persons and in inter-clan 
relationships.  The particular pole created by Mr. Yumbulul was carved from 
cotton wood and surmounted with a crown of lorikeet and white cockatoo 
                                                      
93  See Christoph Antons, Foster v. Mountford: Cultural Confidentiality in a Changing Australia, in 
LANDMARKS IN AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 110-25 (Andrew T. Kenyon, Megan 
Richardson & Sam Ricketson eds., 2009). 
94  See also Pitjantjatjara Council Inc. v Lowe [1982] 4 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 30 (Austl.); see also 
Garth Nettheim, Major Test Case: New High Court Land Rights Challenge, 4 ABORIGINAL L. BULLETIN 11 
(1982). 
95  See Kathy Bowrey, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: An Australian 
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feathers, representing the rays of the Morning Star.  Painted on the pole was 
a design representing the yam spirit man who would climb up the pole 
carrying the spirit of a deceased person to the Morning Star.  The Court 
found the pole to be an original artistic work of Mr. Yumbulul, within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act.  Furthermore, the Court found the artist’s 
copyright in the artifact to have been validly assigned.  This finding was 
sufficient to resolve the claim for breach of copyright.99 
A novel aspect of this case was that Galpu Clan, of which Terry 
Yumbulul was a member, jealously guarded the right of a person to make a 
Morning Star Pole.  Mr. Yumbulul had passed through various levels of 
initiation and revelatory ceremonies in which he learned the Clan’s sacred 
designs and their meanings.  During the last initiation rite in which he 
participated, Mr. Yumbulul was presented with sacred objects, conferring 
his authority to paint the sacred objects of his people.  Following the 
depiction of Mr. Yumbulul’s Morning Star Pole on the commemorative 
banknote, Mr. Yumbulul was criticized by his people who argued that he 
had a cultural obligation to their clan to ensure that a pole was not used or 
reproduced in any way which was offensive in their eyes. 100   Mr. 
Yumbulul’s attempt to set aside the assignment of his copyright in the pole 
on the ground of unconscionability was unsuccessful.  In any event, the 
assignee could have relied upon a special statutory defense to a copyright 
infringement action.  The trial judge acknowledged that it may be the case 
that “Australia’s copyright law does not provide adequate recognition of 
Aboriginal community claims to regulate the reproduction and use of works 
which are essentially communal in origin.”101  He concluded by suggesting 
that “the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal interests 
in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration by law 
reformers and legislators.” 102   More than twenty years after this case, 
appropriate legislation addressing Aboriginal interests in protecting sacred 
works still has not been enacted. 
The first post-Mabo consideration of copyright law to assimilate 
Aboriginal concerns about the unauthorized reproduction of sacred 
Aboriginal images was the Australian Federal Court decision in Milpurrurru 
and Others v. Indofurn Party Ltd. & Others 103  which concerned the 
importation into Australia of a number of carpets woven in Vietnam which 
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incorporated Aboriginal designs.  The applicants were three living 
Aboriginal artists and the Public Trustee claiming on behalf of the estates of 
five deceased Aboriginal artists.  Each of the artists in question had works 
that were either reproduced in portfolios of Aboriginal art produced for the 
Australian National Gallery (“ANG”) or in portfolios published by the 
Australian Government Printer for the Australian Information Service 
(“AIS”).  The first four artists were leading exponents of bark paintings 
illustrating the beliefs of the Aboriginal Peoples of Central Australia.  It was 
agreed that, among the carpets which were the subject of the action, seven of 
the eight artworks were reproduced in virtually identical form and color.  
The final artwork, it was held, was substantially reproduced, albeit in a more 
simplified form.  Evidence was tendered that reproductions of their works 
were permitted by Aboriginal artists in prestigious publications like the 
ANG portfolio and the AIS publication, which were designed for the 
education of members of the white community about Aboriginal culture.  In 
each of the ANG and AIS publications the descriptions of the works made it 
clear that the subject matter of the works concerned stories of spiritual and 
sacred significance to the artist.  It was additionally submitted that painting 
techniques and the use of totemic and other images and symbols were in 
many instances and invariably in the case of important creation stories, 
strictly controlled by Aboriginal law and custom.  It was explained that the 
right to create paintings and other artworks depicting creation and dreaming 
stories and to use pre-existing designs and clan totems resided in the 
traditional custodians of the stories.  Because artworks are an important 
means of recording these stories, it was pointed out that errors in 
reproduction could cause deep offense.104 
While Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia established that there 
are no communal rights to copyright, Milpurrurru v. Indofurn considered 
whether damages could be awarded to a plaintiff because of spiritual harm 
suffered by the plaintiff and by members of the tribe or clan group due to the 
wrongful use of sacred images. 
Ms. Banduk Marika first raised this question in her depiction of the 
story related to a site on her clan (Rirratjingu) land, at Port Bradshaw south 
of Yirrkala in the Northern Territory of Australia, “where our creation 
ancestors, the Djangkawu, visited on their journey across Arnhem Land.”105  
She explained further that: 
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When the Djangkawu handed over this land to the Rirratjingu 
they did so on the condition that we continued to perform the 
ceremonies, produce the paintings and the ceremonial objects 
that commemorate their acts and journeys. . . .  The place, 
Yalangbara, and the particular story of the Djangkawu 
associated with it do not exist in isolation.  They are part of a 
complex or “dreaming track” stretching from the sea off the 
east coast of Arnhem Land through Yalangbara, across the land 
to the west of Ramingining and Milingimbi.106 
Her right to use this imagery arose out of her membership of the 
Yolgnu Clan, the traditional custodians of the Arnhem Land region of the 
Northern Territory region.  She explained by affidavit that “as an artist, 
whilst I may own the copyright in a particular artwork under Western law, 
under Aboriginal law I must not use an image or story in such a way as to 
undermine the rights of all the other Yolngu.”107  She submitted that the 
reproduction of the artwork in circumstances where the dreaming would be 
walked on was totally opposed to the cultural use of the imagery in her 
artwork.  She explained that the misuse of her artwork had caused her great 
concern and that if it had come to the attention of her family she could have 
been subject to a catalog of sanctions ranging from being outcast to a 
prohibition against further artistic production.  Having found an 
infringement in the copyright of Ms. Marika’s works, in quantifying her 
damages the Court took into account the potential sanctions to which she 
may have been subject by her people.  No damages could be awarded to any 
of the deceased artists in relation to the harm suffered by their people.  The 
Judge explained that “statutory remedies do not recognize the infringement 
of ownership rights of the kind which reside under Aboriginal law in the 
traditional owners of the dreaming stories and the imagery such as that used 
in the artworks of the present applicants.”108 
The issue of the communal rights of Aboriginal Peoples in relation to 
the harm done to their spiritual beliefs in a copyright infringement context 
was raised in John Bulun Bulun & Anor v. R & T Textiles Party Ltd.109  This 
case arose out of the importation and sale in Australia of printed clothing 
fabric which infringed the copyright of the Aboriginal artist, Mr. John Bulun 
Bulun, in his work Magpie Geese and Water Lillies at the Waterhole.  Mr. 
Bulun Bulun and Mr. George Milipurrurru, both members of the Ganalbingu 
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people, initiated the proceedings.  Ganalbingu country is situated in Arnhem 
Land in the Northern Territory of Australia.  Mr. Bulun Bulun sued as legal 
owner of the copyright in the painting and sought remedies for infringement 
under the Australian Copyright Act 1968.  Mr. Milpurrurru brought the 
proceedings in his own name and as a representative of the Ganalbingu 
claiming that they were the equitable owners of the copyright subsisting in 
the painting.110 
Mr. Milpurrurru’s painting depicted the waterhole Djulibinyamurr, the 
place from which Barnda, the long-necked turtle creator ancestor of the 
Ganalbingu people, had emerged.  Mr. Bulun Bulun’s affidavit explained 
that his ancestors were granted responsibility by Barnda to maintain and 
preserve all of the Mayardin (corpus of ritual knowledge) associated with the 
Ganalbingu land.  Part of the artist’s responsibility as “Djungayi” or 
manager of the Mayardin, was to create paintings in accordance with the 
laws and rituals of the Ganalbingu people.  He claimed that the unauthorized 
reproduction “threatens the whole system and ways that underpin the 
stability and continuance of [the artist’s] society.  It interferes with the 
relationship between people, their creator ancestors, and the land given to 
the people by their creator ancestor.”  Mr. Bulun Bulun explained that all of 
the traditional owners of the Ganalbingu land would have to agree on any 
exploitation of art works depicting sacred sites, such as the waterhole.111 
The claim for copyright infringement was accepted by the respondents, 
and Mr. Milpurrurru’s representative action questioned whether the 
communal interests of traditional Aboriginal owners in cultural artworks, 
recognized under Aboriginal law, created binding legal or equitable 
obligations on persons outside the relevant Aboriginal community.  The 
assertion by the Ganalbingu of rights in equity depended upon there being a 
trust impressed on expressions of ritual knowledge, such as the Magpie 
Geese and Water Lillies at the Waterhole.  The Court acknowledged that 
among African tribal communities, tribal property was regarded as being 
held on trust by the customary head of a tribal group.  However, the court 
here found no evidence of an express or implied trust created in respect of 
Mr. Bulun Bulun’s art.  This was an issue of intention and the court found no 
evidence of any practice among the Ganalbingu whereby artworks were held 
in trust. 
In an extensive obiter dictum in this test case, the Court found the 
subsistence of a fiduciary relationship between Mr. Bulun Bulun and the 
Ganalbingu people.  This relationship was said to arise from the trust and 
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confidence by his people that his artistic creativity would be exercised to 
preserve the integrity of the law, custom, culture, and ritual knowledge of 
the Ganalbingu.  The court concluded that this finding did not treat the law 
and custom of the Ganalbingu as part of the Australian legal system, rather it 
treated these matters as part of the factual matrix, characterizing the 
relationship as one of mutual trust and confidence from which fiduciary 
obligations arose.  Thus, Mr. Bulun Bulun’s fiduciary obligation was “not to 
exploit the artistic work in such a way that is contrary to the laws and 
custom of the Ganalbingu people, and, in the event of infringement by a 
third party, to take reasonable and appropriate action to restrain and remedy 
infringement of the copyright in the artistic work.”112 
However, in dismissing the representative action of Mr. Milpurrurru 
against the respondents, the court ruled that the rights of the Ganalbingu 
were confined to a right in personam against Mr. Bulun Bulun to enforce his 
copyright in works against third party infringers.  Here, because Mr. Bulun 
Bulun had successfully enforced his copyright, there was no need for the 
intervention of equity to provide any additional remedy to the beneficiaries 
of the fiduciary relationship.  The Court speculated that had Mr. Bulun 
Bulun failed to take action to enforce his copyright, the beneficiaries might 
have been able to sue the infringer in their own names.113 
VI. REFORM OF AUSTRALIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TO PROTECT 
THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS OF ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
Perceived inadequacies in IP law as a vehicle for the protection of the 
spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples have 
prompted a number of suggestions for the modification of that law.114  In a 
1994 Issues Paper, Stopping the Rip-Offs: Intellectual Property Protection 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General’s Department analyzed the limitations of the current 
Australian IP regime in protecting the intellectual property rights of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  This paper identified several 
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possible approaches to improve the situation, including amendments to the 
Copyright Act, 1968, which would require a mark to authenticate Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander creations and special legislation.  The Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”) conducted consultations 
seeking the views of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples on the 
form and content of any proposed legislation.115  In early 1996, ATSIC 
established an Indigenous Reference Group to manage the consultations.116  
In June 1996, it commissioned the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies (“AIATSIS”) to manage the consultations.  A 
report produced by the consultants in June 1997 addressed methods for 
protecting indigenous knowledge under the patents and copyright systems.117  
The Moral Rights Act 2000 amended the Australian Copyright Act 
1968 to include the protection of the moral rights of attribution and the right 
to not have a work treated in a derogatory manner.  In 2001, the Coalition 
Federal Government, in its arts policy for the general election of that year, 
promised that amendments to this moral rights regime would “give 
Indigenous communities a means to prevent unauthorized and derogatory 
treatment of works that embody community images or knowledge.”118  On 
July 23, 2001, the Government announced an independent inquiry (“Myer 
Review”) into the contemporary visual arts and craft sector to recommend 
actions for governments and the sector to enhance their future. 119   The 
inquiry found that the communal rights of Aboriginal Peoples were ignored 
in the current moral rights law and that “the right to integrity and prohibition 
of derogatory treatment of an artistic work embodying traditional ritual 
knowledge should be extended to include a treatment that causes cultural 
harm to the clan,” and that there should be amending legislation.120  In 
December 2003, a draft Copyright Amendment (Indigenous Communal 
Moral Rights) bill 2003 was distributed for comment to a number of 
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(quoted in NEW SOUTH WALES GOV’T).  
119  CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFT INQUIRY: REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH BY THE 
CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFT INQUIRY 21 (2002). 
120  Id. at 152. 
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organizations.121  The bill was criticized for its complexity and the ambiguity 
of its language122 and, in February 2006, it was announced that a revised 
version of the bill would be made available later that year.123  But, this bill 
languished, and in 2006, the 215-page Copyright Amendment Act 2006 was 
enacted to give effect to the copyright provisions of the Australia–United 
States Free Trade Agreement of 2004.124  In 2007, a change of government 
took place.  While in opposition, the current Labor government indicated 
that it would consider implementing the recommendations of the Myer 
Review.125  Yet, to date there have been no such developments.126 
VII. INDIGENOUS CULTURAL PROTOCOLS 
In the absence of legislation Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples have promulgated cultural protocols to prescribe appropriate 
dealings with their cultural artifacts.127  Although not legally binding, the 
protocols are important in raising the profile of indigenous peoples sacred 
beliefs in a cultural context. 128   Additionally, compliance with these 
protocols is made a precondition for university ethics clearance and for 
public funding.129 
VIII. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ DECLARATIONS 
Frustrated at the lengthy delay in the formulation of both national and 
international standards for the protection of the IP rights of indigenous 
peoples, a number of indigenous peoples have taken it upon themselves to 
formulate those rights.  A significant initiative during the UN International 
                                                      
121  See Jane Anderson, Indigenous Communal Moral Rights: The Utility of an Ineffective Law, 30 
INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 8 (2004); Jane Anderson, The Politics of Indigenous Knowledge: Australia’s 
Proposed Communal Moral Rights Bill, 27 UNIV. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 585 (2004). 
122  For example, J. Lindgren, President of the Australian Copyright Tribunal.  See C. Sexton, In 
Conversation with the Honourable Justice Lindgren, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FORUM: JOURNAL OF THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 8–10 (2004).  
123  SUBMISSION OF INDIGENOUS HIGHER EDUCATION ADVISORY COUNCIL TO AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR THE ARTS AND IP AUSTRALIA (June 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/Submission_-_Indigenous_Higher_Education_Advisory_Council.pdf. 
124  See Kimberlee Weatherall, Of Copyright Bureaucracies and Incoherence: Stepping Back From 
Australia’s Recent Copyright Reforms, 31 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 967 (2007). 
125  Federal Labor Arts Policy Discussion Paper (July 30, 2006), available at http://www.alp.org.au/ 
download/now/federal_labor_arts_policy_discussion_paper.pdf.  
126  The Bill was not introduced into the 2012 Australian Parliament and it will be interesting to see 
whether it is taken up by the principal political parties as an issue for the September 2013 general election. 
127  See JANKE & QUIGGIN, supra note 116, at 484. 
128  See Jane Anderson, The Pragmatic Politics of Protocols, presented at SHARING THE CULTURAL 
AND THEORETICAL SPACE, AIATSIS BIANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INDIGENOUS STUDIES (Canberra, Nov. 25, 
2004). 
129 See Kathy Bowrey, Alternative Intellectual Property: Indigenous Protocols, Copyleft and New 
Juridifications of Customary Practice, 6 MACQUARIE L.J. 65 (2006). 
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Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples was a Conference on Cultural and 
Intellectual Property held on Kuku Yalanji Aboriginal land in the Daintree 
Forest area of Far North Queensland in November 1993 which adopted the 
Julayinbul Statement on Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights.130   The 
Julayinbul Statement affirmed the unique spiritual and cultural relationship 
of Indigenous Peoples with the Earth which determined their perceptions of 
intellectual property.  The Statement asserted that “Aboriginal intellectual 
property, within Aboriginal Common Law, is an inherent inalienable right 
which cannot be terminated, extinguished or taken.”  The Statement called 
on governments to review legislation and non-statutory policies that did not 
recognize indigenous intellectual property rights and to implement such 
international conventions that do recognize these rights.  The Conference 
also issued a Declaration Reaffirming the Self Determination and 
Intellectual Property Rights of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the 
Wet Tropics Rainforest Area.  This Declaration was primarily concerned 
with bioprospecting and the intellectual property rights of indigenous 
peoples to traditional knowledge. 
The Julayinbul Statement was one of a number of similar declarations 
issued by Indigenous Peoples.  These included the Mataatua Declaration on 
the Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples issued 
by the Nine Tribes of Mataatua in the Bay of Plenty Region of Aotearoa, 
New Zealand in June 1993.131  The Mataatua Declaration recommended in 
Article 1 that in the development of policies and practices, indigenous 
peoples should “define for themselves their own intellectual and cultural 
property and it noted that “existing protection mechanisms are insufficient 
for the protection of Indigenous Peoples Intellectual and Cultural Property 
Rights.”  The Mataatua Declaration in Article 2.1 recommended that in the 
development of policies and practices, States and national and international 
agencies "should recognize that indigenous peoples are the guardians of their 
customary knowledge and have the right to protect and control 
dissemination of that knowledge.”  A number of similar declarations were 
issued by groups of Indigenous Peoples in Asia,132 the Pacific,133 Africa,134 
and Central135 and South America.136 
                                                      
130  Reproduced in Aboriginal Intellectual and Cultural Property, Conference Proceedings 25-27 
(Queensland Rainforest Aboriginal Network, Jimgarra, Nov. 1993). 
131  THE NINE TRIBES OF MATAATUA IN THE BAY OF PLENTY REGION AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND, THE 
MATAATUA DECLARATION ON CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
(N.Z. 1992), available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/creative_heritage/indigenous/link0002.html. 
132  Tambunan Statement on the Protection and Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge, February 
(1995) (Malay.). 
133  Suva Statement on Indigenous Peoples Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights, (1995) (Fiji). 
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The culmination of this declaratory activism was the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”), adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 13, 2007.137  143 
member states voted in favor of UNDRIP as a non-binding text which sets 
out the rights of indigenous peoples to “maintain and strengthen their own 
institutions, cultures and traditions, and to pursue their development in 
keeping with their own needs and aspirations.”138  Relevant to the protection 
of the spiritual beliefs of indigenous peoples is Article 11(2) which requires 
that “States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, 
…developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their … 
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed 
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs” and Article 12 
which recognized the right of indigenous peoples to “. . . maintain, protect 
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, 
such as ...artefacts, designs, ceremonies, . . . and literature . . . .” 
Article 31 of UNDRIP recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to 
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions. 
Four UN Member States (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the 
United States) voted against the Resolution adopting UNDRIP and eleven 
countries abstained.  Senator Marise Payne explained the various reasons for 
the Australian Government’s opposition to the Declaration.  She pointed out 
that “as our laws here currently stand, we protect our Indigenous cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expression to an 
extent that is consistent with both Australian and international intellectual 
property law, and we are not prepared to go as far as the provisions in the 
text of the draft declaration currently do on that matter.”139  In other words, 
Senator Payne seemed to indicate that the Australian Government was 
opposed to any sui generis protection of traditional knowledge.  She also 
indicated the Australian Government’s opposition to “the inclusion in the 
text of an unqualified right of free, prior and informed consent for 
                                                                                                                                                              
134  INTERNATIONAL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT KHOI-SAN 
TERRITORY, KIMBERLY DECLARATION (2002). 
135  Santa Cruz de la Sierra Statement on Intellectual Property, (1994) (Bol.). 
136  THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON TERRITORY, ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, KARI-OCA DECLARATION (1992), available at http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/ 
htmls/karioca.html. 
137  U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.S. GAOR, 61st Sess., 
Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/61/53 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_
en.pdf. 
138  Id. at Preamble. 
139  CTH. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, Senate 53 (Sept. 10, 2007) (Marise Payne, Senator).   
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indigenous peoples on matters affecting them,” because the text did “not 
acknowledge the rights of third parties–in particular, their rights to access 
indigenous land and heritage and cultural objects where appropriate under 
national law.” 140   With the change of government in Australia, Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd announced on April 3, 2009 Australian support for the 
Declaration.141  In 2010, the other three opposing states also indicated their 
support for the Declaration.142  However, as will be mentioned below, in the 
negotiations within WIPO for an international sui generis law to protect 
traditional cultural expressions and traditional knowledge, Australia, 
together with the other opponent states, continues to be an unenthusiastic 
supporter of this proposal. 
One unstated reason why Australia, together with the United States, 
New Zealand and Canada, opposes the kind of rights contained in the 
UNDRIP is that from the date of the first Indigenous Peoples declaration, the 
protection of the sacred beliefs, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions of Indigenous Peoples has been linked with the issue of 
political self-determination.  The International Labour Organization (“ILO”) 
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries, which had entered into force on September 5, 1991 
called attention to the distinctive contribution of indigenous peoples to 
cultural diversity and affirmed the right of indigenous peoples to self-
identification.  The Kari-Oca Declaration, issued on May 30, 1992 and 
agreed upon in Brazil by indigenous peoples from the Americas, Asia, 
Africa, Australia, Europe and the Pacific, 143 asserted that: 
                                                      
140   Id. 
141  Experts Hail Australia’s Backing of UN Declaration of Indigenous People’s Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE, Apr. 3, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3038
2. 
142  New Zealand announced its official endorsement of the Declaration on April 18, 2010.  See Pita 
Sharples, New Zealand Statement on Adoption of Declaration at UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ISSUES AND RESOURCES, http://indigenouspeoplesissues 
.com/index.php?option=com_ content&view =article &id =4850:new-zealand-statement-on-adoption-of-
declaration-at-un-permanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues&catid=58:oceania-indigenous-
peoples&Itemid=80 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).  Canada announced its official endorsement on Nov. 12, 
2010.  See Canada Endorses the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ISSUES AND RESOURCES (Nov. 12, 2010), available at 
http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php? option= com_content &view=article&catid= 52 :north-
america-indigenous-peoples&id=7509:canada-canada-endorses-the-united-nations-declaration-on-the-
rights-of-indigenous-peoples.  On Dec. 16, 2010, President Obama at the second White House Tribal 
Conference declared that the United States would sign the declaration.  See VICTORY: U.S. Endorses UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, Dec. 16, 2013, available at 
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/united-states/victory-us-endorses-un-declaration-rights-indigenous-
peoples). 
143  See THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON TERRITORY, ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 136. 
MARCH 2013 PROTECTING THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 415 
 
We, the Indigenous peoples, maintain our inherent rights to 
self-determination.  We have always had the right to decide our 
own forms of government, to use our own laws, to raise and 
educate our children, to our own cultural identity without 
interference. 
 
Twenty years later on June 19, 2012, on the occasion of the Rio+20 Earth 
Summit the Kari-Oca 2 Declaration was issued by 500 representatives of 
Indigenous Peoples from around the world. 144   As with the original 
Declaration it combined concerns with access to biological resources, 
intellectual property rights and self determination in the following terms: 
 
As peoples, we reaffirm our rights to self-determination and to 
own, control and manage our traditional lands and territories, 
waters and other resources.  Our lands and territories are at the 
core of our existence–we are the land and the land is us; we 
have a distinct spiritual and material relationship with our lands 
and territories and they are inextricably linked to our survival 
and to the preservation and further development of our 
knowledge systems and cultures, conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and ecosystem management. 
We reject the assertion of intellectual property rights over the 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge of Indigenous 
peoples which results in the alienation and commodification of 
Sacred essential to our lives and cultures.145 
 
The assertion by Indigenous Peoples to self determination has also 
been made by them in submissions to the WIPO IGC on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.  For 
example at the 6th meeting of the IGC in Geneva March 15-19, 2004, the 
Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (“ATSIC”), 
among a number of Indigenous Peoples organizations, 146  submitted that 
“[a]n international regime must ensure that the right to prior informed 
consent of Indigenous peoples is guaranteed and protected, as a fundamental 
                                                      
144  See Kari-Oca 2 Declaration, INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK–ROAD TO RIO+20 AND 
BEYOND (June 19, 2012, available at http://indigenous4motherearthrioplus20.org/kari-oca-2-declaration/. 
145  Id. 
146  Australia (ATSIC), Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA), Assembly 
of First Nations, Call of the Earth, Canadian Indigenous Biodiversity Network, Coordinating Body of 
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA), Indigenous Peoples Caucus of the Creators 
Rights Alliance, Hoketehi Moriori Trust, Rekohu, Aotearoa (New Zealand), International Indian Treaty 
Council, the Kaska Dena Council and the Saami Council. 
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principle in the exercise of self-determination and sovereignty of Indigenous 
Peoples.” 147   ATSIC had been established by the Hawke Labour 
Government in 1990 as a body to represent the interests of Aboriginal 
Peoples,148 but it was abolished in 2004 largely because of allegations of 
financial mismanagement.  Then Prime Minister John Howard explained 
that, "the experiment in elected representation for indigenous people has 
been a failure,” 149  and its functions were transferred to a Government 
Department. 150   The abolition of ATSIC was described by Aboriginal 
Peoples as “a calculated blow to end prospects for Indigenous self-
determination.”  In this political context, Australian Government support for 
the intellectual property aspirations of Indigenous Peoples which have a self 
determination implication151 are doomed to failure.  This will be the case in 
other countries, particularly those where Indigenous Peoples have not yet 
established their right to exist as a defined group. 
IX. INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS 
CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS 
A possibility for the protection of the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal 
peoples exists within the negotiations at WIPO for an international regime to 
protect traditional cultural expressions and folklore.  Agitation for an 
international instrument providing for the protection of the cultural and 
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples had precipitated a joint 
UNESCO/WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Folklore which was 
convened in Phuket, Thailand, in April 1997.  One of the results of this 
Forum was the institution by WIPO of fact-finding missions “to identify and 
explore the intellectual property needs, rights and expectations of the holders 
of traditional knowledge and innovations, in order to promote the 
contribution of the intellectual property system to their social, cultural and 
economic development” in its 1998-99 biennium.  Australia was the first 
                                                      
147  See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, 
REGARDING A PROSPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL REGIME (2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ngo/kdc_igc6_doc6_6.pdf. 
148  The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (“ATSIC Act”) established the 
ATSIC, which took effect on March 5, 1990.  See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 
1989 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.).   
149  See Clark Vows to Fight as ATSIC Scrapped, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 15, 2004, 
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/04/15/1081998279884.html. 
150  Renamed on January 27, 2006 and currently known as the Office of Indigenous Policy 
Coordination in the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. 
151  See H. Fourmile, Aboriginal Heritage Legislation and Self Determination, 7 AUSTRALIAN-
CANADIAN STUDIES, SPECIAL ISSUE 45 (1989).  
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port of call for this expert mission, and experts visited Darwin and Sydney 
from June 14-18, 1998. 
In a note dated September 14, 2000, the Permanent Mission of the 
Dominican Republic to the United Nations in Geneva submitted two 
documents on behalf of the Group of Countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (“GRULAC”) calling for the creation of a Standing Committee 
on access to the genetic resources and traditional knowledge of local and 
indigenous communities.152  “The work of that Standing Committee would 
have to be directed towards defining internationally recognized practical 
methods of securing adequate protection for the intellectual property rights 
in traditional knowledge.” 153   In 2000, WIPO established an 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”).  In March 2004, 
the IGC began to consider the ‘objectives’ and ‘principles’ which should 
animate the protection of traditional cultural express (“TCE”)154 and this task 
has continued through all the subsequent sessions of the IGC.155   Draft 
articles for a convention on TCEs were prepared for consideration by the 
17th session of the IGC, December 6-10, 2010.156  This draft has been the 
basis of discussions in subsequent sessions of the IGC and the most recent 
version is that which was presented to the 22nd session of the IGC July 9-13, 
2012.157 
In this session, there was agreement that the Preamble in the draft should 
contain the recognition that the protection of TCEs should aim to recognize 
and promote respect for the spiritual values of Indigenous peoples and 
should prevent the misappropriation of their TCEs and empower them to 
exercise in an effective manner their rights and authority over their own 
TCEs.  However, in the substantive parts of the draft there are a number of 
options for defining TCEs, the beneficiaries, and scope of protection.  This 
                                                      
152 See Traditional Knowledge and the Need to Give it Adequate Intellectual Property Protection, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, Sept. 25-Oct. 3, 2000, WIPO Doc.WO/GA/26/9 Annex I, 10, 26th 
Sess. (2000). 
153  Id. 
154 See Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic Resources: The 
International Dimension, World Intellectual Property Organization, Mar. 15-19, 2004, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/7, 6th Sess. (2003).   
155 The most recent contribution in this regard is The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Cultural Expressions of Folklore. Revised Objectives and Principles, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/4 17th Sess. (2010). 
156 Draft Articles on the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore 
Prepared at IWG 1, World Intellectual Property Organization, Dec. 6-10, 2010, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/9, 17th Sess. (2010). 
157 Decisions of the Twenty-Second Session of the Committee, World Intellectual Property 
Organization, July 9-13, 2012, 22d Sess. (2012), WIPO doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/22/4, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_22/wipo_grtkf_ic_22_ref_decisions.pdf. 
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reflects the lack of unanimity of the various blocs of countries involved in 
the negotiations.  The IGC has referred this draft to the General Assembly of 
WIPO, which will endeavor to fashion a consensus document which in the 
fullness of time will be referred to a diplomatic conference if it is to become 
an international convention.  As an international organization of member 
states, the representation of the interests of traditional and indigenous 
communities within those member states will have to be considered. 
X. THE PROTECTION OF SACRED ABORIGINAL IMAGES AND PRACTICES AS 
AN ASPECT OF NATIVE TITLE LAW 
Given that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples define 
themselves and their existence by reference to their “Country”158 and given 
the establishment of native title rights following Mabo, it might have been 
thought that the sacred beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples might have been protected as a native title right, but this possibility 
was dashed by the majority judgement of the High Court in Western 
Australia v. Ward.159 
The first case which raised the issue of Aboriginal communal rights 
over their tribal lands was Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd.160  The Yolngu 
People, living in Arnhem Land, in the Northern Territory of Australia, 
brought this case against a company that had obtained a twelve-year bauxite 
mining lease from the Federal Government.  The trial judge acknowledged 
that “the fundamental truth about the aboriginals’ relationship to the land is 
that whatever else it is, it is a religious relationship. . . .  There is an 
unquestioned scheme of things in which the spirit ancestors, the people of 
the clan, particular land and everything that exists on and in it, are organic 
parts of one indissoluble whole.”161  The Yolngu’s claim did not succeed 
because it was not until Mabo v. Queensland [No 2]162 twenty years later 
that the terra nullius doctrine was rejected and the existence of native title 
was acknowledged by the High Court. 
In response to the Mabo determination, the Federal Parliament passed 
the Native Title Act 1993, establishing the Native Title Tribunal to register, 
hear and determine native title claims according to the principles established 
by the Act. 
                                                      
158 See Drahos, supra note 17.. 
159   [2002] HCA 28 (Austl.). 
160  (1971) 17 FLR 141, 167 (Austl.). 
161  Id. at 167. 
162  (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
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In Neowarra v. State of Western Australia, 163  the Native Title 
Tribunal referred to the significance of repainting Wandjina images as 
evidence of the connection of Aboriginal Peoples with the land.  This 
suggests that the spiritual practices of Aboriginal Peoples, inevitably linked 
to their land, could indeed be regarded as an aspect of native title. 
The High Court, in Yanner v. Eaton,164 considered an appeal by a 
member of the Gunnamulla clan of the Gangalidda tribe from Northern 
Queensland who was prosecuted under the Queensland 1974 Fauna 
Conservation Act for killing juvenile estuarine crocodiles in Cliffdale Creek 
in the Gulf of Carpentaria area of Queensland.  The Magistrate initially 
found that the appellant’s clan “have a connection with the area of land from 
which the crocodiles were taken” and that this connection had existed 
“before the common law came into being in the colony of Queensland in 
1823 and . . . thereafter continued.”165   He further found that it was a 
traditional custom of the clan to hunt juvenile crocodiles for food and that 
the evidence suggested that the taking of juvenile rather than adult 
crocodiles had “tribal totemic significance and [was based on] spiritual 
belief.”166  The Magistrate found the appellant not guilty and dismissed the 
charge. The Court of Appeal of Queensland set aside the order of the 
Magistrates Court,167 on the application of the prosecution and the defense 
appealed from this decision to the High Court of Australia. 
The High Court referred to the observations of Justice Brennan in R. V. 
Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station Party Ltd.168 that “Aboriginal ownership 
is primarily a spiritual affair rather than a bundle of rights,” but that 
“[t]raditional Aboriginal land is not used or enjoyed only by those who have 
primary spiritual responsibility for it.  Other Aboriginals or Aboriginal 
groups may have a spiritual responsibility for the same land or may be 
entitled to exercise some usufructuary right169 with respect to it.”170  The 
Court observed that “an important aspect of the socially constituted fact of 
native title rights and interests that is recognised by the common law is the 
spiritual, cultural and social connection with the land.”171  It held that the 
                                                      
163  [2003] FCA 1402 (Austl.). 
164  [1999] HCA 53 (Austl.). 
165  Id. at para. 4. 
166  Id. 
167  Eaton v Yanner; Ex parte Eaton (Unreported, Court of Appeal of Queensland, 27 Feb. 1998). 
168  (1982) 158 CLR 327 (Austl.). 
169  Usufruct, derived from civil law, is a right of enjoyment, enabling a holder to derive profit or 
benefit from land that either is owned by another, as long as the property is not damaged or destroyed.  See, 
“Definition of ‘usufruct,’ available at http://definitions.uslegal.com/u/usufruct/. 
170  Id. at 358. 
171  [1999] HCA 53 at para. 38 (Austl.). 
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Fauna Act did not extinguish the rights and interests of the Aboriginal 
appellant and that by operation of Subsection 211(2) of the Native Title Act 
and Section 109 of the Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of 
Federal over State laws, the Fauna Act did not prohibit or restrict the 
appellant, as a native title holder, from hunting or fishing for the crocodiles 
he took for the purpose of satisfying personal, domestic, or non-commercial 
communal needs.172 
The Native Title Act detailed the circumstances in which native title 
rights might be extinguished by executive action. The High Court in Western 
Australia v. Ward173 examined the principles of extinguishment in a native 
title claim by the Miriuwung Gajerrong people over 7,900 square kilometers 
of land and water in the east Kimberley area of Western Australia and part 
of the Northern Territory.  The Court explained that the relationship between 
Aboriginal Peoples and the land was sometimes spoken of as “having to care 
for, and being able to ‘speak for’ country” in the sense “that, at least in some 
circumstances, others should ask for permission to enter upon country or use 
it or enjoy its resources.”174   This case raised the issue of whether this 
relationship between land and Aborginal Peoples could be translated into a 
positive right for Aboriginal peoples to insist upon the protection of their 
sacred images. Initially, the judge in the Federal Court of Australia had 
determined native title in favor of the Miriuwung Gajerrong people, 
recognizing “a right to maintain, protect and prevent the misuse of cultural 
knowledge of the common law holders associated with the ‘determination 
area.’”175  The Full Federal Court disagreed, setting aside the lower court’s 
decision:  “Although the relationship of Aboriginal people to their land has a 
religious or spiritual dimension, we do not think that a right to maintain, 
protect and prevent the misuse of cultural knowledge is a right in relation to 
land of the kind that can be the subject of a determination of native title.” 176 
The appellants to the High Court submitted that the Full Court had erred and 
that the first determination should be restored. 
The majority of the High Court pointed out that the first difficulty in the path 
of that submission was the imprecision of the term “cultural knowledge” and 
the apparent lack of any specific content given it by factual findings made at 
trial.177  The Court acknowledged that, “access to sites where artworks on 
                                                      
172  Id. at para. 39. 
173   [2002] HCA 28 (Austl.). 
174  Id. 
175  Quoted in [2002] HCA 28 at para. 40. 
176  (2000) 99 FCR 316 at 483 [666] (Austl.). 
177  [2002] HCA 28 at para. 58 (Austl.). 
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rock are located, or ceremonies are performed, the traditional laws and 
customs which are manifested at these sites answer the requirement of 
connection with the land,” required by the Native Title Act.178  However, the 
High Court ruled that, “it is apparent that what is asserted goes beyond that 
to something approaching an incorporeal right akin to a new species of 
intellectual property to be recognised by the common law” under the Act 
and that: 
 
The “recognition” of this right would extend beyond denial or 
control of access to land held under native title.  It would, so it 
appears, involve, for example, the restraint of visual or auditory 
reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there, 
or elsewhere.  It is here that the second and fatal difficulty 
appears.179 
The Majority observed that it “is not to say that in other respects the general 
law and statute do not afford protection in various respects to matters of 
cultural knowledge of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders.”180  The 
general law and statute which the High Court had in mind was exclusively 
“the law respecting confidential information, copyright, and fiduciary 
duties,” referring to the intellectual property cases mentioned above, as well 
as the provision respecting moral rights in Part IX of the Copyright Act of 
1968. 181   As discussed above, the Australian case law, however, has 
identified a number of limitations of Australian intellectual property law, 
and the Myer Review found that the moral rights provisions of the Copyright 
Act were inadequate for Indigenous Peoples. 
Although in his minority decision Mr. Justice Kirby, a leading Australian 
human rights jurist,182  agreed with the majority that the right to protect 
cultural knowledge had not been well defined in the submissions made to the 
Court because a degree of specificity was required in determining such 
claims.  But he pointed out that this itself might sometimes create problems 
because of the internal rules of some Aboriginal communities, that cultural 
knowledge, or at least some of it, may be treated as a secret:  “not to be 
shared with strangers to that community whether indigenous or non-
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indigenous, indeed sometimes not to be shared even with all members of the 
community itself.”183 
Mr. Justice Kirby acknowledged that in the cases thus far, the native 
title rights claimed had generally related physically to land or waters in a 
manner analogous to common law property concepts, but that as native title 
was sui generis it not be restricted to rights with precise common law 
equivalents.184  He considered that these rights could extend to “restricting 
the reproduction of a Dreaming story relating to a particular site, where the 
reproduction could be proved to contravene Aboriginal law.”185  Mr Justice 
Kirby noted that in evidence, the Ningarmara appellants described the "land-
relatedness" of their spiritual beliefs and cultural narratives, 186  and that 
Dreaming Beings located at certain sites are narrated in song cycles, dance 
rituals and body designs.  Because this cultural knowledge, as exhibited in 
ceremony, performance, artistic creation, and narrative, is inherently related 
to the land according to Aboriginal beliefs, it followed logically that the 
right to protect such knowledge was related to the land for the purposes of 
the Native Title Act,187. Mr. Justice Kirby asserted that this construction was 
consistent with the purposes of the Act, as evinced in the Preamble, 
including the full recognition of the rich culture of Aboriginal peoples and 
the acceptance of the "unique" character of native title rights and that it was 
further supported by Australia's ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.188  He quoted from the Draft United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for the proposition that 
such rights include the right of indigenous people to have "full ownership, 
control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property."189 
Mr. Justice Kirby rejected the misgivings of the majority that the right 
claimed was "akin to a new species of intellectual property" pointing out that 
it must be accepted that the established laws of intellectual property are ill-
equipped to provide full protection of the kind sought in this case.190  The 
perceived inadequacies of Australian intellectual property law, even in its 
reformed condition to protect the sacred beliefs of aboriginal peoples has led 
                                                      
183 Id. at para. 577. 
184  Id. at para. 577. 
185 Id. at para. 578. 
186  Id. at para. 580. 
187  Id.  Justice Kirby referred to evidence of the land-relatedness in the Federal Court decision in 
Western Australia v. Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316 at 539-540 [865] (Austl.). 
188  [2002] HCA 28 at para. 581 (Austl.). 
189  Id. 
190  Id. at para. 582 (referring to Yumbulul v Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481 at 484, 490 
as an example). 
MARCH 2013 PROTECTING THE SPIRITUAL BELIEFS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 423 
 
to calls for this protection to be guaranteed by sui generis legislation. These 
calls have been made by Indigenous Peoples themselves and in the context 
of negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”). 
XI. THE PROTECTION OF ABORIGINAL SPIRITUAL BELIEFS WITHIN 
PROTECTED CULTURAL LANDSCAPES 
The protection of significant cultural locations provides the opportunity for 
the protection of land associated with the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  The UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
(“WHC”), when promulgated in 1972, sought to facilitate the protection of 
monuments and sites of “outstanding universal value.” 191  Subsequently, it 
was acknowledged that the Convention should expand beyond architectural 
monuments such as Angkor Wat and embrace sites with significance for 
cultural heritage. 192  The recognition of cultural landscapes as an explicit 
category of cultural heritage was recognized in the 1992 version of the 
Operational Guidelines adopted by UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Committee.193  The Guidelines provided for the protection of organically 
evolved landscapes that result from “an initial...religious imperative” and 
which have developed “by association with and in response to it a natural 
environment,” and retaining “an active social role in contemporary 
society.”194  An Australian example of such a cultural landscape is the Uluru 
Kata Tjuta National Park, in the Northern Territory, which was added to the 
World Heritage List as a place of sacred significance to the Anangu 
Aboriginal People. It has been observed that “the material forms of Uluru 
and Kata Tjuta incorporate the actions, artefacts and bodies of ancestral 
beings celebrated in Anangu religion and culture through narratives, 
elaborate song cycles, visual arts, and dance.”195  The numerous paintings in 
the rock shelters at the foot of Uluru (Ayers Rock) were identified as 
physical embodiments of “Tjukurpa,” which is the spiritual philosophy of 
the Anangu. 196   These spiritual sites are protected through a Board of 
Management which has been established for the National Park and 
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administered by the Aboriginal Central Land Council.  These bodies 
maintain the traditional ceremonial activities of the Anangu and control that 
the access of visitors to spiritual sites respects the spiritual values of the 
Anangu197 and can be closed to tourists when ritual activities are taking 
place. 
Most Australian States and Territories have heritage legislation 
establishing registers which list known sites of spiritual significance to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, although commentators have 
suggested that in practice this legislation masks the obliteration of 
Indigenous heritage. 198  The most significant instance of the failure of 
heritage legislation to protect a sacred Aboriginal site was the exemption 
from protection of the development of a marina and associated bridge on 
Hindmarsh Island (Kumarangk), situated in the Murray River delta in South 
Australia.  This was opposed by a group of women of the Ngarrindjeri 
People claiming to be the custodians of secret “women’s business” 
concerning the creation and renewal of life for which the island had 
traditionally been used. An application for Ministerial protection was sought 
under the Federal Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Act 1984.  This was referred by the Minister for report under the Act, but a 
declaration based on this report was quashed in the Federal Court.199  In May 
1995, the South Australian media carried reports on the “secret women's 
business” and on June 16, 1995 the South Australian Government appointed 
a Royal Commissioner inquire into and report on whether any aspect of the 
“women’s business” was a fabrication.  The Royal Commissioner, Judge Iris 
Stevens’ principal findings were that there was “no suggestion” of 
“women’s business” at Hindmarsh Island and that these beliefs had been 
concocted in order to persuade the federal government to ban the Hindmarsh 
Island Bridge.200  On the publication of the Royal Commissioner’s Report 
the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement applied to the Minister for a further 
order to prevent the Hindmarsh Island Bridge from being built. This he 
granted, and appointed Justice Jane Matthews of the Federal Court to 
prepare a second report.  Her report201 was on the basis that her appointment 
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was incompatible with her judicial office.202  There was then a change of 
Federal Government and the newly appointed Government then enacted the 
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act of 1996 to prevent any further reference to the 
secret women’s business in evaluating the development of Hindmarsh 
Island.  The Ngarrindjeri challenged the legislation in the High Court on the 
basis that it was discriminatory to declare that the Heritage Protection Act 
applied to sites everywhere but on Hindmarsh Island, claiming that this was 
invalid discrimination on the basis of race.  The High Court decided that the 
Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act had successfully removed the Hindmarsh 
Island area from the purview of the Racial Discrimination Act.203  The final 
episode in this saga was a defamation action successfully brought by the 
developers of the Hindmarsh Island marina against environmental groups 
and other critics of the development.204  In his first decision, Judge von 
Doussa stated that he was not satisfied that the claims of "secret women's 
business" had been fabricated205 and the Ngarrindjeri and their supporters 
took this as a vindication of their position, although controversy still clouds 
the issue.206 
A perceived current failure of the Western Australian heritage 
legislation is its approval for the construction of an extensive natural gas 
mining facility on the Burrup Peninsula (Murujuga), which contains the 
world’s largest outdoor rock engraving site, dating back some 30,000 
years.207  Extensive destruction of this rock art has already been reported.208 
XII. THE FUTURE 
Section 51 (xxvi) of the Australian Constitution gives the 
Commonwealth government power to make special laws for peoples of any 
race.  On August 10, 1987, Prime Minister Hawke announced the formation 
of a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of deaths of Aboriginal 
people while held in State and Territory goals.  The 1991 Report of the 
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Royal Commission recommended that all political leaders and their parties 
recognize that reconciliation between the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples and other Australians must be achieved if community 
division, discord and injustice to Indigenous Australians were to be 
avoided. 209   In April 1991, the Constitutional Centenary Conference 
recommended that among other things the reconciliation process should seek 
to secure the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples through 
changes to the Constitution.210 
The current Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, Robert 
French, who was the trial judge in Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia,211 
observed that “the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal communal 
interests in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for consideration 
by law reformers and legislators.”212  He endorsed the recommendation of 
the Constitutional Commission that Section 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution be 
replaced by a provision empowering the Federal Parliament to make laws 
with respect to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples “based not on 
race but on the special place of those peoples in the history of the nation.”213 
In late 2010, Australia’s National Report to the UN Human Rights 
Council for the purpose of Universal Periodic Review confirmed the 
Australian Government’s commitment to the recognition of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian Constitution and had 
appointed an Expert Panel to provide options on the form of the amendment 
to the Constitution which would achieve this result.214  In December 2010, 
the Prime Minister announced the membership of an Expert Panel on 
Constitutional Recognition for Indigenous Australians.  The Expert Panel’s 
Report of January 2012 recommended replacing Section 51 (xxvi) with the 
power to allow the Federal Parliament to make laws with respect to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.215  The Expert Panel reported 
that its consultations established that “Aboriginal cultures need to receive 
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greater constitutional protection.”216  It is feasible that with the change to the 
Australian Constitution, Federal legislation could achieve the protection of 
the spiritual beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples.  This 
would be legislation in which their spiritual beliefs would be protected as a 
sui generis right, rather than as a subsidiary category of some other body of 
law. This legislation would establish as a matter of substantive principle, the 
right of indigenous peoples to maintain the integrity of their spiritual beliefs 
from misappropriation, misrepresentation, adulteration and demeaning use.  
A threshold issue will be the identification of those spiritual beliefs.  This 
will obviously involve some input from the representative bodies of 
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